INTRODUCTION
Can singing a song constitute incitement to genocide? A recent decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the prosecution of Rwandan Hutu extremist pop singer Simon Bikindi said it can. 3 But it failed to say precisely why. 4 This is problematic because a string of Rwandan genocide judicial decisions, 5 Bikindi' s songs "advocated Hutu unity against a common foe and incited ethnic hatred" and that they were "deployed in a propaganda campaign in 1994 in Rwanda to incite people to attack and kill Tutsi . . ."). 4 Instead, as discussed at Section III.D infra, the Tribunal did not engage in this analysis because it found Bikindi was not responsible for broadcasting the songs and had not contemplated using them in connection with a genocide when he recorded them. 5 relevant precedent from the Nuremberg jurisprudence, 6 had developed a sound framework for incitement law that had begun to draw "a bright line between freedom of speech and incitement to genocide." 7 Although the ICTR acquitted Bikindi with respect to his pop songs, it convicted him of direct and public incitement to commit genocide for exhorting Hutu militia on a bullhorn to attack Tutsi civilians. 8 In arriving at these decisions, the ICTR neglected systematically to apply, much less develop, that existing framework. 9 As a result, incitement law has reached a crucial crossroads. There is a risk that the legal edifice constructed by previous decisions will be abandoned as a frame of reference. In the first place, the incitement law framework had not been systematically laid out in one single decision. 10 Rather, it had been pieced together in a series of decisions that culminated in the ICTR's "Media Case" trial judgment, where it found its most developed formulation.
11 That opinion suggested a base to which future decisions would return as a point of repair and build on as a platform for normative development.
12
The Bikindi Judgment failed to do either. As a result, jurisprudential consistency and coherence could be compromised to the point where future incitement defendants may not understand the grounds on which they are to be judged. Moreover, even if the framework in its current form were applied reliably and systematically, a failure to flesh it out could be fatal --its current supple contours, which provide necessary interpretational flexibility, could be exploited to justify suppression of legitimate expression. 13 Thus, greater interpretational guidance would seem to be in order.
In response, certain commentators have called for the use of alternate tests. Professor Susan Benesch, a former journalist, believes the elements formulated by the ICTR should be rejected and international law should start from scratch.
14 She has proposed the "reasonably probable consequences" test, which precludes an incitement finding unless a number of factors can be proved, such as prior "audience conditioning" and previous "similar messages." 15 Similarly, Dr. Carol Pauli, a professor of communications and law, has formulated the "communications research" test, which she advocates using for more effective incitement prevention. 16 While these tests are helpful for contextualizing incitement analysis, they would be a poor substitute for the existing framework as they are either too inflexible, inconsistent with the basic requirements of incitement law, or procedurally incompatible. 17 Nevertheless, they help reveal incitement law's recent problems and suggest solutions.
This Article will propose a more acceptable "middle-ground" solution and explain how incitement law can regain its footing. It will begin in Part II by examining the ICTR incitement precedents and the framework they constructed. As will be demonstrated, the framework has sufficient range and depth to permit principled discernment between permissible hate speech and criminal incitement. But it has always contemplated further judicial sculpting and refinement. Part III will look at the most recent decisions whose results have been doctrinally consistent with the framework but whose methods of analysis have been opaque and anemic. Part IV will examine the alternate frameworks proposed by the commentators. Part V will reject these new tests as wholesale substitutes for the existing framework, but will suggest how they may be useful in putting incitement law back on the right path. That path will entail systematizing, fleshing out, refining and expanding the existing framework.
In the end, the Article will conclude that the necessary upgrades can best be accomplished by folding certain of the proposed alternate test elements into the existing incitement framework Such an integration will help ensure greater consistency and guidance in applying ICTR precedent. At the same time, it will enhance protection of free expression while keeping incitement law focused on its primary objective -genocide prevention. Finally, consistent with this, the Article will advocate the establishment of a systematic typology of incitement techniques that will permit a superior understanding of the crime's scope and bolster preventive approaches to enforcing it.
II. THE INCITEMENT LAW FRAMEWORK PRE-BIKINDI
A.
PROSECUTOR V. AKAYESU
The incitement law framework, as I have noted elsewhere, 18 was cobbled together in a string of decisions stretching back to Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 19 which found a Rwandan mayor guilty of, inter alia, inciting Hutu militia to slaughter his town's Tutsi population. 20 In the words of the Tribunal: "Akayesu then clearly urged the population to unite in order to eliminate what he termed the sole enemy: the accomplices of the Inkotanyi."
21 Expert and lay testimony established that this was understood by the audience as an exhortation to murder Tutsis 22 and Tutsis were in fact murdered in the town shortly thereafter.
23
The seminal Akayesu judgment, the first genocide adjudication pursuant to a trial in history, 24 set out the lion's share of the elements for incitement to genocide: its mens rea (consisting of the dual intent to provoke another to commit genocide and to commit the underlying genocide itself);
25 its "direct" element (viewing the speech "in the light of its cultural and linguistic content" to determine if "the persons for whom the message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof"); 26 and its "public" element ("a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a public place" or to "members of the general public at large by such means as the mass media, for example, radio or television").
27
B.
KAMBANDA, RUGGIU, AND NIYITEGEKA
Three subsequent decisions further refined the analysis with respect to the "direct" element by considering the use of veiled exhortations, euphemisms, and post-violence condoning in incitement. In Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 28 the incitement charge against the Prime Minister of the rump genocide regime was based in part on his congratulating génocidaires who had already killed (a form of incitement patently less direct than requests or commands) 29 refuse to give your blood to your country and the dogs drink it for nothing." 30 Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 31 RTLM announcer Georges Ruggiu's incitement conviction was based on his broadcast of incendiary euphemisms such as urging the population to deal with the "Inyenzi,"
32 "go to work," 33 and "finish off the 1959 revolution" (code words for incitement to massacre the Tutsi population). 34 Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka 35 provided further insight regarding the directness calculus. As Rwandan Minister of Information during the genocide, Niyitegeka had taken part in various massacres against Tutsis. 36 After one massacre, he used a loudspeaker to thank the perpetrators for their "good work." 37 The ICTR found this referred to the "killing of Tutsi civilians" and it was, in part, the basis of an incitement conviction. 38 C.
THE MEDIA CASE
1.

Trial Chamber Decision
The final pieces of the puzzle were filled in by the Trial Chamber decision in Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, 39 commonly referred to as the "Media Case." The defendants who went on trial in the matter were Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, founders and directors of Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) -an extremist Hutu radio station that broadcast Tutsi hate rhetoric and calls for violence during the genocide, 40 and Hassan Ngeze, editor-in-chief of the Hutu hate newspaper Kangura. 41 The Tribunal was called on to assess, among other things, whether the RTLM broadcasts and Kangura writings constituted direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 42 The two key incitement elements treated in this decision were causation and content. 43 With respect to the former, the Trial Chamber erased any lingering doubts as to whether the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide requires a showing of violence occasioned by the incitement. It found it does not.
Regarding content, the Trial Chamber explicitly focused (through its subheadings) on two criteria through which speech content regarding race or ethnicity could be classified as either legitimate expression or criminal advocacy: its purpose 45 (ranging, on one end of the spectrum, from clearly legitimate purposes, such as historical research and dissemination of news, to patently criminal purposes such as explicit calls for violence) 46 and its context (circumstances surrounding the speaker's text -such as contemporaneous large-scale interethnic violence, as well as the speaker's tone of voice). 47 In examining this decision, I have pointed out that, in fact, the Trial Chamber included in its analysis two additional criteria (even though not directly classified as such: text and the relationship between speaker and subject). 48 Concerning "text," the Trial Chamber discussed it under the "purpose" subheading (as it would help further reveal the purpose of the speech) and it involved a parsing and exegetical interpretation of the key words in the speech. 49 Finally, with respect to the relationship between the speaker and the subject, the Trial Chamber indicated that the analysis should be more speech-protective when the speaker is part of a minority criticizing either the government or the country's majority population. 50 Thus, while the decision implicitly taught that content could be analyzed according to purpose, text, context, and the relationship between speaker and subject, these elements were not laid out in an explicit, systematic manner. 
Appeals Chamber Decision
On November 28, 2007, the ICTR Appeals Chamber issued its decision in the Media Case and left undisturbed those portions of the judgment analyzing the elements of direct and public incitement to genocide. 52 In the most relevant portion of the decision, the judges held:
The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did not alter the constituent elements of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide in the media context (which would have constituted an error) . . . Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that several extracts from the [Trial Chamber] Judgment demonstrate that the Trial Chamber did a good job of distinguishing between hate speech and direct and public 45 Id. ¶ ¶ 1000-1006. 46 Id. ¶ ¶1004-1006. Of course, the area between these extremes is fertile ground for contextual analysis. Incitement law decisions have referred to contextual evaluative factors such as surrounding violence and previous rhetoric. See, e.g., Nahimana, id. at ¶ 1004 (speaking of massacres taking place surrounding the speakers utterance); ¶ 1005 (focusing on previous conduct to reveal purpose of text). 47 incitement to commit genocide . . . .The Appeals Chamber will now turn to the Appellants' submissions that the Trial Chamber erred (1) in considering that a speech in ambiguous terms, open to a variety of interpretations, can constitute direct incitement to commit genocide, and (2) in relying on the presumed intent of the author of the speech, on its potential dangers, and on the author's political and community affiliation, in order to determine whether it was of a criminal nature. The Appellants' position is in effect that incitement to commit genocide is direct only when it is explicit and that under no circumstances can the Chamber consider contextual elements in determining whether a speech constitutes direct incitement to commit genocide. For the reasons given below, the Appeals Chamber considers this approach overly restrictive.
53
It should be noted that the Appeals Chamber found that, based on the evidence, certain pre-genocide speech could not be considered incitement beyond a reasonable doubt. 54 It also concluded that the pre-1994 conduct of the defendants, which the Trial Chamber considered part of the incitement crimes at issue, was outside the ICTR's temporal jurisdiction --and this resulted in a reduction of the defendants' respective sentences. 55 In this regard, it is significant that the prosecution had tried to place Hassan Ngeze's 1990-1993 Kangura articles within the Tribunal's 1994 temporal jurisdiction by linking them to a 1994 RTLM radio contest that asked members of the public to find information from back issues of Kangura. 56 In rejecting incitement charges based on such back issues, the Appeals Chamber implicitly suggested two new potential elements for the incitement framework: temporality (the allegedly inciting articles were not written contemporaneous with their re-publication) and instrumentality (it was RTLM, not Ngeze, who was responsible for or instrumental in their publication).
57
The Appeals Chamber also noted that the "re-publication" affected the directness calculus: "Even if, in attempting to find the answers to the questions asked in the competition, the participants happened to re-read certain extracts from Kangura capable of inciting the commission of genocide, this could only constitute an indirect incitement to genocide." 58 Notwithstanding issues of temporality, the Appeals Chamber generally validated the approach taken by the ICTR Trial Chambers in their incitement jurisprudence to that point. But it could have provided more enlightening guidance. In particular, this was a 53 Id. ¶ ¶ 696-97. Susan Benesch states that the Appeals Chamber "rebuked" the Trial Chamber for "not drawing a clear line between hate speech and incitement to genocide." See Benesch, supra note 14, at 489. As indicated clearly by ¶ ¶ 696-97, however, her statement is simply not supported by the actual text of the decision. 54 See, e.g., id. ¶ ¶ 740-51. 55 See, e.g., id. ¶ 314. 56 Id. ¶ 410. 57 Id. 58 Id.
perfect opportunity to review the elements of the incitement framework in a rigorous manner and explain in greater detail how they should be applied. Instead, the Appeals Chamber simply gave its general stamp of approval and avoided entering into the details. The chance to enrich and regularize the incitement analysis was lost and would inspire a similarly lax approach in analysis the following year in the Bikindi decision.
The next major incitement opinion related to the Rwandan genocide was handed down by the Canadian Supreme Court in Mugesera v. Canada. 59 Although Léon Mugesera's case was decided in the immigration context 60 (he had fled Rwanda and arrived in Canada after delivering an infamous speech calling for Tutsi extermination in veiled terms), 61 it provided the Canadian high court with the opportunity to analyze the elements of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 62 Mugesera's hate-laced speech, the basis of the deportation action, was sufficiently oblique (for example, his famously suggesting that the Tutsis should return to Ethiopia via the non-navigable Nybarongo River, a traditional dumping ground for massacre victims) 63 that the ICTR's guiding principles were helpful in focusing the Court on the essential analytic criteria and permitting it to find that Mugesera had indeed committed the incitement crime. 64 But once again, the Court failed to engage a disciplined point-by-point analysis. 65 By this point, a series of core incitement criteria had been enunciated and applied to reach well-reasoned and consistent results. But the criteria were being used in a desultory manner -not sufficiently rigorous or systematic in application. As the Mugesera decision was being published, another Rwandan incitement defendant was awaiting trial. Extremist pop singer Simon Bikindi's case would present the international community with the intriguing question whether incitement to genocide could be accomplished through lyrics and a melody.
III. THE SIMON BIKINDI CASE: MUSIC AND GENOCIDE
A. BACKGROUND
On June 15, 2005, the ICTR indicted popular Rwandan singer Simon Bikindi on six counts for crimes perpetrated in 1994, including one count of direct and public incitement to commit genocide pursuant to Articles 2(3)(c) and 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. 66 The incitement charge was based on the playing and dissemination of Bikindi's extremist Hutu songs (both at political rallies, during radio broadcasts, and at pre-killing meetings) and his speeches exhorting extremist Hutu party activists and militia to exterminate the Tutsi population.
67
In the media buzz and academic discourse surrounding the case, much attention was focused on the songs. 68 Bikindi was a well-known composer of popular music and director of the Irindiro Ballet, a dance company choreographed to traditional Rwandan rhythms. 69 Bikindi was also an official in the Ministry of Youth and Sports of the Government of Rwanda and a member of President Habyarimana's MRND political party. 70 But it was primarily as a tunesmith that Bikindi attained great fame in Rwanda before the genocide. His songs were aired in bars, buses, salons and even offices. 71 Wealthy families would hire his band for their children's wedding ceremonies.
72 During this period, Bikindi composed the infamous "Njyewe nanga Abahutu" ("I Hate the Hutu") as well as other songs including "Bene Sebahinzi" ("Descendants of the Father of Farmers") and "Twasezereye ingoma ya cyami" ("We Said Goodbye to the Monarchy").
73
These songs were alleged to have characterized Tutsis:
[As] Hutu enslavers, enemies or enemy accomplices by blaming the enemy for the problems of Rwanda, by continuously making references to the 1959 Revolution and its gains by the rubanda ngamwinshi [Hutu] and by supporting the Bahutu Ten Commandments, and inciting ethnic hatred and people to attack and kill Tutsi.
74
.
Experts on incitement law eagerly anticipated the Tribunal's judgment given the free-speech implications of criminalizing artistic expression (in this case songs) in a genocidal context. John Floyd, Hassan Ngeze's Media Case attorney, expressed particular concern over Simon Bikindi's indictment for inciting genocide through his lyrics. Floyd compared prosecuting Bikindi to "putting Bob Dylan on trial for protest songs." 75 Robert Snyder pointed out that Bikindi's indictment:
[C]ould lead to a backlash against musicians who arguably support one ethnic, political, or social group over another. Considering that Bikindi's songs are characterized by the prosecution as only songs of Hutu solidarity and not direct calls for the killing of Tutsis, a large range of potential music could be affected.
76
However, Snyder also noted the case's potential for strengthening freedom of expression:
By stressing the context in which Bikindi wrote and performed these songs and his position of influence with Rwandans, the Tribunal can limit the potential impact of any conviction. It was not the fact that Bikindi merely wrote and performed this music that made his actions potentially criminal. Rather, it was the message of the songs, combined with their presentation amidst calls for outright genocide on the airwaves of RTLM and at gatherings of the Interahamwe that made Bikindi's music so deadly.
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THE DECISION
In the end, for incitement experts, the Bikindi judgment was cause for neither despair nor rejoicing. In effect, the Tribunal punted. Although it ruled that Bikindi's songs "advocated Hutu unity against a common foe and incited ethnic hatred" 78 and that they were "deployed in a propaganda campaign in 1994 in Rwanda to incite people to attack and kill Tutsi" 79 (in effect finding they could have constituted incitement to genocide), the Tribunal found insufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt "that Bikindi composed these songs with the specific intention to incite such attacks and killings, even if they were used to that effect in 1994." 80 Moreover, the Tribunal held there was insufficient evidence proving Bikindi "played a role in the dissemination or deployment of his . . . songs in 1994." 81 In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal did not include in its analysis an explicit consideration of purpose, text, context, and the relationship between speaker and subject. It paid minimal lip service to context only holding that:
[To] determine whether a speech rises to the level of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, context is the principal consideration, specifically: the cultural and linguistic content; the political and community affiliation of the author; its audience; and how the message was understood by its intended audience, i.e. whether the members of the audience to whom the message was directed understood its implication. And it acknowledged that a "direct appeal to genocide may be implicit; it need not explicitly call for extermination, but could nonetheless constitute direct and public incitement to commit genocide in a particular context." 83 Based on this, it found that, "depending on the nature of the message conveyed and the circumstances," it could not exclude the possibility that songs may constitute direct and public incitement to commit genocide." 84 At the same time, the Tribunal attributed Bikindi's liability for incitement uniquely to an incident that occurred in late June 1994 on a road between the Rwandan towns of Kivumu and Kayove, where Tutsi were being murdered. One witness testified that, during his outbound travel to Kivumu, Bikindi, riding in a truck with a loudspeaker, addressed himself to the militias doing the killing. 85 Bikindi is reported to have said: "You sons of Sebahinzi, who are the majority, I am speaking to you, you know that the Tutsi are minority. Rise up and look everywhere possible and do not spare anybody." 86 The witness interpreted this to mean that although some Tutsi had already been killed, others were hiding and Bikindi was calling on people to do all that was necessary to eliminate the Tutsi. 87 The witness also testified that on the way back from Kayove, Bikindi stopped at a roadblock and met with leaders of the local Interahamwe where he insisted, "you see, when you hide a snake in your house, you can expect to face the consequences."
88 After Bikindi left the roadblock, members of the surrounding population and the Interahamwe intensified their search for Tutsi, using the assistance of dogs and going into homes to flush out those still hiding. 89 The witness stated that a number of people were subsequently killed. 90 Another witness testified that, on Bikindi's return trip from Kayove, he heard Bikindi ask over a truck loudspeaker "[h]ave you killed the Tutsis here?" and he further asked whether they had killed the "snakes." 91 He also heard Bikindi's songs being played as the vehicles moved on. 92 Based on these statements, the Tribunal found:
Bikindi's call on "the majority" to "rise up and look everywhere possible" and not to "spare anybody" immediately referring to the Tutsi as the minority unequivocally constitutes a direct call to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group. Similarly, the Chamber considers that Bikindi's address to the population on his way back from Kayove, asking "Have you killed the 83 Id. 84 Id. ¶ 389. 85 Id. ¶ 268. 86 Id. 87 Id. 88 Id. 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 Id. ¶ 269. 92 Id.
Tutsis here?" and whether they had killed the "snakes" is a direct call to kill Tutsi, pejoratively referred to as snakes. In the Chamber's view, it is inconceivable that, in the context of widespread killings of the Tutsi population that prevailed in June 1994 in Rwanda, the audience to whom the message was directed, namely those standing on the road, could not have immediately understood its meaning and implication. The Chamber therefore finds that Bikindi's statements through loudspeakers on the main road between Kivumu and Kayove constitute direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 93 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION
What can be concluded from this decision? First of all, like the Canadian Supreme Court in the Mugesera case, the Tribunal squandered a golden opportunity to both solidify and flesh out the new analytic incitement law structure set forth in previous Rwandan decisions. Its failure explicitly to ground itself and build on existing precedent could ultimately jeopardize the jurisprudential gains in incitement law and leave it open to attacks that it is capricious and inimical to healthy free expression. Bikindi's lyrics should have been systematically filtered through the purpose, text, context, and speakersubject crucible. That exercise would have bestowed the test with superior interpretive power and greater normative coherence. And the Tribunal's conclusions might have been perceived as resting on less slender of a reed.
But it is important to note that the result would not likely have changed. Because, in another sense, the Tribunal got it right. And while the journey may in some respects be more important than the destination, the Tribunal's doctrinal instincts were no doubt tempered by strains of stare decisis emanating from Akayesu and its prodigy. Detailed consideration of Bikindi's lyrical objectives and the words he used to attain them, in light of their context and notwithstanding their being voiced by a member of the majority attacking the minority, in all likelihood would have exonerated the tunesmith. So the Tribunal's jurisprudential incitement compass appears well aligned even if its precise reading remains obscure.
D.
TWO NEW ANALYTIC CRITERIA: TEMPORALITY AND INSTRUMENTALITY Moreover, even had the results of the existing test itself not been exculpatory, the Tribunal seems to build on the logic of the Media Case Appeals Chamber decision by reprising the two new analytic criteria to determine whether a speaker has engaged in genocidal incitement: temporality and instrumentality. 94 This would appear to be relevant in cases where speech is re-published by a third party after initially being uttered by the original speaker. . 95 Id.
First, in light of its finding that Bikindi wrote the songs long before they were disseminated during the genocide, the Tribunal noted that Bikindi could not have had the requisite genocidal intent. In effect, the Tribunal impliedly incorporated a "temporality" criterion --the offensive words must have been uttered at or near the time of the contextual violence that renders them genocidal. 96 In this case, Bikindi composed his songs long before the 1994 mass murders. 97 Similarly, the Tribunal appears to find significance in the manner of the songs' dissemination in relation to the violence. While recordings of the songs might have been played as a prelude to and in chorus with the massacres, those electronic reproductions were not within Bikindi's control. 98 And so an implied "instrumentality" criterion can be gleaned from the judgment as well. In other words, when recordings are involved, the recorded would-be inciter must be responsible for actual contemporaneous dissemination of the criminal speech (i.e., the playing of the recording) that is charged. Perhaps in part because the ICTR incitement framework has not been applied consistently or systematically in the written decisions, it has been subject to attack from 96 The analogy with re-publication of Ngeze's pre-1994 articles is apt except that music is routinely rebroadcast whereas written text is more likely to be published on one occasion. 97 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 255. 98 Id. ¶ 263. 99 As pointed out in the Media Case Appeals Chamber decision with respect to Ngeze's re-published 1990-1993 articles, the re-publication in Bikindi (i.e., the re-playing of the songs) would likely also entail a finding that the alleged incitement was not sufficiently direct. Had the victims-to-be already suffered an outbreak of recent violence?
(4) Survival of Marketplace of Ideas
Were contrasting views still available at the time of the speech? Was it still safe to express them publicly?
(5) Dehumanization and Audience Conditioning
Did the speaker describe the victims-to-be as subhuman, or accuse them of plotting genocide? Had the audience been conditioned by the use of these techniques in other, previous speech?
(6) Prior Similar Messages
Had the audience received similar messages before the speech? 110 2.
Problems with the Test
a. Rigidity
Unfortunately, Benesch's proposed test is absolute. As she states it: "In my view, all six prongs must be satisfied for a court to find that incitement to genocide has been committed by a defendant."
111 While Benesch's criteria are helpful in analyzing whether lawful hate speech has become illicit incitement, her approach is too lock-step and rigid and completely does away with the flexible four-part test that had been developed by the ICTR. How can this rigidity potentially cause problems?
Imagine, for example, that in the context of massive inter-ethnic violence, which has been raging in a country for several days, a high-ranking government official, belonging to the country's ethnic majority, makes a speech on the radio euphemistically calling for destruction of the country's ethnic minority (by telling the ethnic majority they need to "go to work" on the minority). The speech is understood by the audience as a call to genocide and uses coded language to justify and promote violence. The speech targets have been the subject of ethnic violence for nearly a week and the government has a complete monopoly on access to media outlets. Under Benesch's proposed test, this will not qualify as incitement to genocide simply because: (1) the speaker did not describe the victims-to-be as specifically subhuman or accuse them of plotting genocide (and the audience had not been "conditioned" by the use of these techniques in other, previous speech); 112 and (2) the audience has not received similar messages before the speech. 113 Given the context of mass ethnic violence and the target audience's understanding and willingness to act on the message, however, this seems like the wrong result and inconsistent with the ICTR test.
114 This is especially true since, as I have written elsewhere, 115 the incitement crime should be geared toward prospective genocide prevention, not merely retrospective punishment. 116 Benesch's proposed hair-splitting would certainly chill preventive enforcement. Moreover, given the absolute nature of the test, it is problematic that portions of its terminology are ambiguous. For example, what constitutes "an outbreak of recent violence"? How "recent" does it have to be? Does it have to be violence on a certain scale (as measured in numbers of dead or wounded) or can it be extreme, brutal violence visited on a smaller number of victims? How is one to determine whether the audience had previously been "conditioned" by the use of similar speech techniques? What qualifies as "conditioning"? How is it to be measured? How can it be determined whether the "conditioning" is causally related to those techniques? Given the precision demanded by the test, it is problematic that no answer to these questions, among others, suggests itself. 112 See Benesch, supra note 14, at 498. 113 Id. 114 Cf. Incitement to Indictment, supra note 11, at 893-907 (applying ICTR incitement framework to the case of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). 115 See Id. at 857, 918 ("Ahmadinejad's incendiary speeches present the world with a golden opportunity to use the incitement charge for its intended purpose: to prevent genocide, not merely to punish it ex post facto."). 116 Id. 117 See Response to Benesch, supra note 10.
c. Finality
Finally, Benesch apparently means for the "reasonably possible consequences" test to be a self-contained universe. I do not doubt the thoroughness of Professor Benesch's research but her personally gleaning six prongs merely represent her observations about speech and violence from existing fact patterns. It is quite possible that other indicators could be discerned.
118
For example, it might be useful to inquire whether the particular speaker has a history of successfully inciting violence. It might also be critical to know whether channels of communication are being used that have a greater propensity for inciting imminent violence (radio or television, say, as opposed to newspapers or pamphlets).
119
Genocide scholars have also pointed to the fact that genocide has empirically been connected with war.
120 Perhaps Benesch should have included the existence or imminent outbreak of war between the perpetrating government and another sovereign (or between the perpetrating government and an internal armed rebel group) as another element of her test. It is problematic that such an absolute test does not include these potentially relevant indicators of "reasonably possible consequences." C.
THE "COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH FRAMEWORK"
1.
Formulation of the Test
Another test has recently been proposed by Professor Carol Pauli, who seeks to use a "communications research" framework for determining when incitement to genocide warrants prior restraint through such means as jamming broadcast signals. 121 In other words, she examines communications research postulates such as the "ritual model," "the spiral of silence," 122 and "dependence theory." 123 According to Pauli, the framework culled from such work should comprise the following elements: 118 See, e.g., Pauli, supra note 16, 4-5 (observing that the Benesch test "omits some factors that may prove decisive in determining prospectively when a broadcast or other mediated speech is dangerous enough to justify intervention."). 119 In fact, this element is so independently important that it will be suggested as a separate criterion to be added to the existing incitement framework. See Section V.C.1 infra. 120 121 Pauli, supra note 16, at 5 ("[This paper] proposes a framework, based on research in the field of communication, to determine when a message constitutes incitement to genocide so as to justify international prior restraint through measures such as jamming of broadcast signals."). 122 Id. at 8 n.51. 123 Id. at 11.
(1) Media Environment
Finding incitement more likely in a coercive media environment with an absence of competing messages and frequent message repetition;
(2) Political Context
Postulating that incitement is more likely when political instability heightens audience dependence on the communication media and thereby strengthens the influence of the hate messages on audience members;
(3) Audience Characteristics
Finding the impact of a message may be stronger where the audience is young or unsophisticated, already inclined toward prejudiced views or highly networked along such lines as tribal membership and religion);
(4) Authority of Message Source
Where the source of an incendiary statement is a person of authority in the eyes of the audience, concluding that speech will more likely be restricted as dangerous;
(5) Content of the Message
Focusing on text appealing to base emotions and communicating recourse to violence as indicative of incitement;
(6) Channel of Communication
Positing that written text is less likely than broadcast media to lead to violence -distinguishing a "book from a bullhorn," as it were; and (
7) Overt Acts
Opining that overt acts, such as stockpiling weapons, help gauge the immediacy and degree of physical danger posed by the inflammatory speech.
124
2.
Relationship to the Benesch Test
In relation to Benesch, Pauli approaches incitement from the opposite end of the spectrum. While the former is troubled by the retrospective prospect of hate speech being liberally characterized as incitement, the latter is more concerned about prospectively nipping hate speech in the bud before genocide can occur. 125 Nevertheless, many of Pauli's criteria overlap with those of Benesch. 126 Benesch's "Nature of Message and Audience Understanding" prong is comparable to Pauli's "Content of Message" and "Audience Characteristics" elements. "Speaker Authority and Audience Capacity" in the Benesch test largely overlaps with the "Authority of Message Source" and the "Audience Characteristics" in the Pauli framework. Benesch's "Survival of the Marketplace of Ideas" prong is equivalent to Pauli's "Media Environment." Otherwise, Benesch's "Recent Violence" and "Prior Similar Messages" and Pauli's "Political Context and "Channel of Communication," respectively, find no comparable elements in the other test.
Problems with the Pauli Framework
While there is substantial overlap between the two tests, Pauli's framework is different in two important respects that are problematic. First, from a procedural perspective, her test only seeks to determine whether speech should be the object of prior restraint -not whether someone has engaged in criminal incitement. Presumably, her test would carry a different standard of proof, involve a more simplified adjudication process and be used by other adjudicatory bodies -for example, international administrative agencies, such as the International Telecommunications Union. 127 Additionally, she impermissibly alters the substantive burden of proving incitement. In the first place, she erroneously presumes the ICTR framework adds a causation requirement: "Since speech does no physical harm, the ICTR convictions required a finding of an additional proximate cause in order to link incitements to genocide."
128 From this, she concludes she is doctrinally justified in adding an "overt 124 Id. at 14-21. 125 Id. 126 Id. at 4 (noting that the Benesch test's "elements overlap and support several that are also proposed here). 127 Pauli notes that the "ITU constitution prohibits harmful interference to radio signals of other states or recognized broadcast agencies, whether from competing radio signals or other electrical apparatus." Id. at 29. 128 Id. at 20 n.46. Pauli reaches this conclusion by taking out of context a quotation from the Media Case Trial Chamber decision: "The nature of media is such that causation of killing and other acts of acts" requirement for her framework.
129 This is tantamount to a "causation-light" requirement, which is clearly incompatible with the fundamentally inchoate nature of the crime. 130 Second, her test completely omits the element of intent, the key element for any genocide prosecution. 131 Pauli concedes that "because the framework focuses on prevention rather than culpability, it does not . . . include the criminal element of purpose or intent."
132 Without intent, however, there can be no proof of the target crime of genocide and thus a prerequisite of the inchoate crime of incitement to genocide is missing. 133 Overall, then Pauli's test is clearly not a suitable wholesale replacement for the framework developed by the ICTR decisions.
V. SYSTEMATIZING, HARMONIZING AND REFINING THE TESTS
A. SYSTEMATIZATION
So where does incitement law go from here? Certainly, it will be necessary for future decisions to apply the analytic criteria more rigorously and systematically. The degree to which the courts laid out criteria and applied them in a methodical manner seemed to reach a peak in the Media Case decision and has seen a progressive laxness genocide will necessarily be effected by an immediately proximate cause in addition to the communication itself." Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, ¶ 952. In the next sentence, however, the decision goes on to state "In the Chamber's view, this does not diminish the causation to be attributed to the media, or the criminal accountability of those responsible for the communication." Id. Indeed, in this paragraph, the Media Case Trial Chamber decision explicitly rejects a causation requirement for incitement. 129 Unfortunately, this runs counter to her purpose of using incitement for prevention. Adding a physical conduct requirement (overt acts) where there was previously none only increases the burden of proving incitement and seeking enforcement at an early stage that would result in prevention, instead of mere punishment after the fact. 130 from Mugesera to Bikindi (even though Bikindi impliedly introduced the additional elements of temporality and instrumentality).
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For future opinions, a further slide in analytic rigor could either represent the undoing of the jurisprudential advances made by the Rwandan cases or, at worst, signify an impermissible encroachment on hallowed free speech rights. 135 As the world seeks to prevent and punish the use of speech to foment violence based on pernicious discrimination, international courts (and even domestic ones operating under the principle of universal jurisdiction) must religiously apply the elements established by incitement jurisprudence.
B. HARMONIZATION
But crafting disciplined, orderly judicial opinions should not be incitement law's only concern going forward. One would hope that the content of any such decisions would also reflect progress in furthering incitement law's primary objectives: deterring genocide before it can happen and protecting robust free expression. Can these seemingly conflictual objectives be reconciled?
Using the Benesch and Pauli scholarship could be of great assistance in this regard. But, for the reasons outlined above, following Benesch's advice to eliminate the ICTR framework altogether would be a mistake. Instead, certain portions of the Benesch and Pauli tests should be folded into the existing ICTR framework. How could this be accomplished?
First of all, it is important to realize that most of the criteria proposed by Benesch and Pauli fit logically into the broader categories of the ICTR framework. Benesch's "Audience Understanding" criterion, 136 for example, tracks perfectly the ICTR framework's "Direct" analysis -did the person for whom the message was intended immediately grasp the significance thereof? 137 Similarly, Benesch's "Nature of Message" 138 and Pauli's "Content of Message" 139 correspond more or less directly with the "Text" and "Purpose" criteria in the ICTR framework.
140 Along the same lines, when Benesch alludes to "Speaker Authority" 141 and Pauli to "Authority of Message Source" and "Audience Characteristics," 142 each implicates, at least in part, the ICTR's "Relationship between the Speaker and Subject" criterion.
In large part, however, the balance of Benesch/Pauli elements can be placed into the "Context" criterion of the existing ICTR test. 144 In other words, evaluative factors such as "Political Context," "Media Environment," "Recent Violence" and "Prior Similar Message" are extremely useful in helping the finder of fact determine whether hate speech has corroded into incitement to commit genocide. 145 Unlike the Benesch approach, however, which strictly requires that each criterion be satisfied for an incitement finding, 146 using these criteria for evaluative purposes provides guidance and flexibility. It permits judges to perform a nuanced contextual analysis to ascertain if the speech has reached inchoate genocidal critical mass.
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That "recent violence" or "prior similar messages" may be lacking, for example, should not prevent an incitement finding if many of the other contextual factors are present. In effect, this approach allows for a "totality of the circumstances" analysis that will better respect freedom of expression (given the wealth of evaluative factors) while allowing sufficient flexibility for the incitement crime to satisfy its primary preventive function.
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C.
FURTHER REFINEMENT
Adding a "Channels of Communication" Criterion to the Existing ICTR Test
Refinement should not end with an incorporation of the Benesch/Pauli elements into the existing framework. In the first place, one of the Pauli elements, "Channels of Communication" 149 does not fit as neatly into the existing framework. In fact, it should be a separate element. The [Arslan] Court was more forgiving toward a book than it apparently would have been toward other channels of communication. It found a literary work to be less likely than the mass media (presumably meaning the broadcast media) to disturb national security and public order. In this case, the Court overturned speech restrictions placed on a book that painted a negative picture of Turks and their treatment of Kurds. 157 Similarly, "the United States has not criminalized or prosecuted the mere publication of written materials as incitement" 158 because "[t]he root of incitement theory appears to have been grounded in concern over crowd behavior." 159 And availability and circulation of the material should also be taken into account. With respect to the Media Case, for example, American First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams has pointed out that Hassan Ngeze's newspaper, Kangura, was circulated in an environment where "only 30% of Rwandans are literate, [so] the paper was never widely read." 160 In contrast, in Zana v. Turkey, 161 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld the conviction of a former mayor, who spoke approvingly of Kurdish Worker Party violence in a major national daily newspaper. 162 Pauli notes that "the resulting prominence of the statement [given its placement in a major daily national newspaper] was a factor as the Court upheld the speaker's conviction." 163 In the end, when the additional element is tacked on, the existing framework for determining whether hate speech constitutes incitement should now consist of five elements: (1) purpose; (2) text; (3) context; (4) relationship between speaker and subject; and (5) channel of communication.
2.
Refining and Fleshing Out the Context Criterion
Development of the "context" element of the existing ICTR framework would also be in order. To begin, it would be helpful to bifurcate "context" into two separate sub-prongs --internal and external. 164 Internal context would encompass characteristics of the speaker himself: the speaker's background and professional profile, his previous publication/broadcast history, and his personal manner of transmission (including tone of voice). 165 External context would consist of the circumstances surrounding the speech. In addition to incorporating consideration of the Benesch/Pauli elements already discussed above, the supplemental contextual elements alluded to in connection with the Benesch test could also be included (in other words, elements such as speaker's past history and imminent outbreak of war).
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Of particular note, the finder of fact should consider the existence or imminent outbreak of war between the perpetrating government and another sovereign (or between the perpetrating government and an internal armed rebel group).
167 Clearly, the current proposed list of contextual elements is not definitive or final -as new fact patterns are evaluated, additional contextual factors may be gleaned over time.
D. ESTABLISHING A TYPOLOGY OF INCITEMENT
By now, international and domestic courts have scoured over a wide variety of fact patterns involving hate speech that spurred ordinary citizens to slaughter their neighbors by the thousands. Unfortunately, the ICTR has failed systematically to catalogue these incitement techniques and explain their legal significance. This project should be undertaken in future incitement jurisprudence. 168 In particular, future decisions should explicitly recognize the following as indirect but legally chargeable forms of incitement: (1) direct calls for destruction; (2) predictions of destruction; (3) verminization, pathologization, and demonization; (4) accusation in a 164 See Lawrence Schlam, Legislative Term Limitation under a "Limited" Popular Initiative Provision?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 60 (1993) (explaining the significance of distinguishing between internal and external context in statutory interpretation and concluding that "when ambiguity exists --both internal and external context usually must be taken into account to weigh the chances of absurd, unfair or unreasonable results should one interpretation be adopted as compared to another."). 165 As indicated above, tone of voice has already been flagged by the ICTR as an important evaluative factor for the contextual consideration of whether hate speech has devolved into incitement. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, ¶ 1022. 166 See supra text accompanying footnotes 118-120. 167 See SHAW, supra note 120, at 28. 168 This is an initiative I suggested should have been undertaken in the Media Case Trial Chamber judgment. See War of Media, supra note 18, at 187 ("Incitement can take many forms and this might have been a golden opportunity for international law to recognize them explicitly.").
mirror; (5) euphemisms and metaphors; (6) justification during contemporaneous violence; (7) condoning and congratulating past violence; (8) asking questions about violence; and (9) victim-sympathizer conflation.
1.
Direct Calls for Destruction
Direct calls for destruction are relatively rare but there are instances where they should be identified as a separate category. Examples would include RTLM announcer Kantano Habimana's June 4, 1994, broadcast in which he urged listeners to exterminate the "Inkotanyi," or Tutsis, who would be known by height and physical appearance. 169 Habimana concluded: "Just look at his small nose and then break it." 170 Another prominent example would be Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calling for Israel's destruction when he told an audience in October 2005 that Israel "must be wiped off the map." 171 
2.
Predictions of Destruction
Prophesying destruction is another incitement technique. In the Media Case Trial Chamber decision, for example, certain RTLM broadcasts that predicted destruction of the "Inyenzi" (i.e. Tutsis) were among those emissions found to constitute incitement, including the following: I think we are fast approaching what I would call dawn . . . dawn, because-for the young people who may not know-dawn is when the day breaks. Thus when day breaks, when that day comes, we will be heading for a brighter future, for the day when we will be able to say 'There isn't a single Inyenzi left in the country.' The term Inyenzi will then be forever forgotten, and disappear for good . . . .
4.
Accusation in a Mirror
The technique of "accusation in a mirror" consists of imputing to the victim the intention of committing the same crimes that the actual perpetrator is committing. 180 As described by one Rwandan propagandist: "[T]he party which is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror [which will] persuade listeners and 'honest people' that they are being attacked and are justified in taking whatever measures are necessary 'for legitimate [self-]defense." 181 Léon Mugesera used this technique in his infamous 1992 speech when he repeatedly claimed that the "Inyenzi" planned to commit genocide against the Hutu:
These people called Inyenzis are now on their way to attack us . . . I am telling you, and I am not lying, it is . . . they only want to exterminate us. They only want to exterminate us: they have no other aim. Are we really waiting till they come to exterminate us? 182 As Professor Catherine MacKinnon has noted: "This infamous 'accusation in a mirror'--the propaganda technique in which one side falsely attributes attacks to the other in order to justify retaliation in kind, casting aggression as self-defense--was especially causally potent." 183 
5.
Euphemisms and Metaphors
Genocide solicitors rarely use direct language to persuade their agents of destruction to do the dirty deeds. Instead, they typically use code words and this is another incitement technique. In the Rwandan genocide, for example, "go to work," which was perhaps the most prevalent mass slaughter directive, meant "kill Tutsis." 184 As Professor William Schabas has noted: "[t]he history of genocide shows that those who incite the crime speak in euphemisms." 185 
6.
Justification during Contemporaneous Violence
Another incitement technique is to describe atrocities already taking place in ways that convince the audience that they are morally justified. W. Michael Reisman has observed that "in many of the most hideous international crimes, many of the individuals who are directly responsible operate within a cultural universe that inverts our morality and elevates their actions to the highest form of group, tribe, or national defense." 186 Thus, RTLM announcer Georges Ruggiu would ascribe positive virtues to violence (e.g., Israel's aid, declaring: "Anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation's fury." 197 
VI. CONCLUSION
While the forms of incitement to genocide may be protean in nature, there is a fundamental core nature of the crime which incitement law has been striving to define over the past decade. A concept as elusive as incitement cannot be treated along the lines of U.S. Supreme Justice Potter Stewart's oft-quoted approach toward pornography: "I know it when I see it."
198 Neither can it be subjected to a Procrustean treatment that overlooks the individual characteristics and nuances of each exhortation and its contextual setting. The ICTR framework has instead adopted a Solomonic approach that requires consideration of certain essential elements (purpose, text, context and relationship between speaker and subject) but allows jurists a relatively wide berth in applying them to each unique fact pattern.
Nevertheless, this modest degree of structural give at least mandates consistent and rigorous application of the fundamental elements. The post-Media Case trial judgment opinions -Mugesera and Bikindi --have failed to do this, even if they are doctrinally consistent with the spirit of the framework. 199 And while it is instructive to know that music can be a vessel for incitement, such bare-bones pronouncements will not do. We cannot be left to guess why a judge found one statement criminal and another merely radical. Monday morning armchair quarterbacking by incitement experts will never replace sound judicial reasoning in the first instance.
The framework must be strictly applied for each decision and on a point-by-point basis. Moreover, the elements set forth in both the Benesch and Pauli tests -such as political context, media environment, recent violence, and prior similar message -should be folded into the existing framework. That would go a long way toward regularizing the mechanics of incitement analysis should they be considered as evaluative factors (rather than lock-step requirements) within the "context" rubric of the existing framework.
As this Article has demonstrated, however, this would not be enough. First of all, international courts ought to recognize the difference between two different kinds of context --internal (speaker's past messages and his tone of voice, for example), and external (environment and circumstances surrounding the speaker). Such a bifurcation would certainly yield more conceptually refined contextual analysis. In addition, certain supplemental external contextual elements, such as whether the perpetrator's country is waging war or is about to do so, should be considered. More importantly, given the differences between the print and broadcast media, among others, an additional "channels of communication" element should be appended to the existing ICTR framework. The analysis should certainly be more speech protective for written material. And differences among written media, such as paper pamphlet versus instant messaging, should also be taken into account. Rapid cyber-communication arguably has a greater propensity to provoke imminent lawless violence than static printing-press materials. As a result, the test for incitement should now consist of five elements: (1) purpose; (2) text; (3) context; (4) relationship between speaker and subject; and (5) channel of communication.
Finally, it is about time that international judges explicitly acknowledge that incitement techniques are multi-faceted. A popular conception of incitement as a linear directive is misleading and the global citizenry has not been disabused of it through the ICTR's published judicial pronouncements. The latter have, in a desultory fashion, explored the different characteristics of incitement techniques and, when the required elements were present, have found them to be equally criminal. The jurisprudence would do well, going forward, to recognized them explicitly as such and make of them a well defined glossary. A clear understanding that, in addition to direct calls, techniques such as "victim-in-a-mirror" and "sympathizer-victim conflation" constitute legally-recognized methods of prosecutable verbal provocation would help further put the incitement house in order.
Normative coherence, free expression and nonviolence can certainly be harmonized within a maturing incitement framework. None of the nascent problems identified in this Article is by any means intractable or deep-seated. But it is far preferable to correct bad habits now lest they become ingrained and incitement law degenerate into a doctrinal tea-leaf reading exercise. Neither free expression nor genocide prevention goals would be well served under such a scenario. That should not be music to anyone's ears.
